LiteLLM / LiteLLM

LiteLLM Proxy Security Vulnerability — Cross-Team Key Access on /v1/memory CRUD Endpoints

Fix LiteLLM proxy cross-team authorization bypass on memory CRUD endpoints Includes evidence for LiteLLM troubleshooting demand.

Source-backed Last updated May 12, 2026 1 source Needs local verification

Category: LiteLLM
Error signature: Team 2 can do RUD on the key team-1:test without any authorization
Quick fix: Verify the account session, API key, provider settings, and environment where the failing tool is running.
Updated: May 12, 2026
Verification status: Source-backed
Evidence: 1 public source URL

Before you change production

This page includes public source URLs in the imported troubleshooting record. Compare those references with your version and environment before applying changes.

Reproduce the smallest failing action and save non-secret logs before changing configuration.
Check versions for LiteLLM, related SDKs, package managers, CI runners, and hosting providers.
Change one setting or dependency at a time, then rerun the same failing command or request.
Avoid destructive commands, credential rotation, billing changes, or security relaxations without a rollback plan.

What this error means

Team 2 can do RUD on the key team-1:test without any authorization is a LiteLLM failure pattern reported for developers trying to fix litellm proxy cross-team authorization bypass on memory crud endpoints. Based on the imported evidence, treat this as a tool-specific troubleshooting page rather than a generic API error.

Why this happens

Official LiteLLM issue #27722 (2026-05-12) reports security vulnerability: Team 2 can perform RUD operations on Team 1's API keys created via /v1/memory endpoints without authorization. Multi-tenant isolation failure.

Common causes

Security teams and LiteLLM proxy administrators discover that Team 2 can read, update, and delete Team 1's API keys without authorization. This is a multi-tenant isolation failure in a production proxy handling paid API traffic.
Official LiteLLM issue #27722 (2026-05-12) reports security vulnerability: Team 2 can perform RUD operations on Team 1's API keys created via /v1/memory endpoints without authorization. Multi-tenant isolation failure.

Quick fixes

Confirm the exact error signature matches Team 2 can do RUD on the key team-1:test without any authorization.
Check the LiteLLM account, local tool state, and provider configuration involved in the failing workflow.
Verify the account session, API key, provider settings, and environment where the failing tool is running.

Platform/tool-specific checks

Verify the command, editor, extension, or API client that produced the error.
Compare local settings with CI, deployment, or editor-level settings when the error appears in only one environment.
Avoid deleting credentials, local model data, or project settings until the failing scope is clear.

Step-by-step troubleshooting

Capture the exact error message and the command, editor action, or request that triggered it.
Check whether the failure is account/auth, quota/rate, model/provider, local runtime, or deployment configuration.
Review the source evidence below and compare it with your environment.
Apply one change at a time and rerun the smallest failing action.
Keep the working fix documented for the team or deployment environment.

How to prevent it

Keep provider/tool configuration documented.
Record non-secret diagnostics such as tool version, provider name, model name, and command path.
Add a lightweight check before CI or production workflows depend on the tool.

Diagnostic flow for this page

Match Team 2 can do RUD on the key team-1:test without any authorization exactly before applying the quick fix.
Compare the failing environment with LiteLLM versions, account scope, provider settings, and deployment context.
Check the listed common causes in order, starting with the cause that best matches your logs.
Use the evidence status below to decide whether to confirm against public sources or official documentation.
Apply one reversible change, rerun the smallest failing action, and keep rollback notes.

FAQ

What does Team 2 can do RUD on the key team-1:test without any authorization mean in LiteLLM?

Team 2 can do RUD on the key team-1:test without any authorization indicates the workflow described by "LiteLLM Proxy Security Vulnerability — Cross-Team Key Access on /v1/memory CRUD Endpoints" failed in a LiteLLM context. Start by confirming the exact signature and the component that emitted it.

What should I check first for Team 2 can do RUD on the key team-1:test without any authorization?

Check whether this cause matches your environment: Security teams and LiteLLM proxy administrators discover that Team 2 can read, update, and delete Team 1's API keys without authorization. This is a multi-tenant isolation failure in a production proxy handling paid API traffic.

Is the Team 2 can do RUD on the key team-1:test without any authorization guidance source-backed?

The "LiteLLM Proxy Security Vulnerability — Cross-Team Key Access on /v1/memory CRUD Endpoints" page is labeled source-backed. It has 1 public source URL from github.com, so use that evidence status when deciding how much additional verification you need.

When should I avoid the quick fix for Team 2 can do RUD on the key team-1:test without any authorization?

For "LiteLLM Proxy Security Vulnerability — Cross-Team Key Access on /v1/memory CRUD Endpoints", avoid applying "Verify the account session, API key, provider settings, and environment where the failing tool is running." when the error text differs, the affected version or provider is different, or the change would touch credentials, billing, DNS, production deploy settings, or irreversible data.

What should I collect before debugging Team 2 can do RUD on the key team-1:test without any authorization?

For "LiteLLM Proxy Security Vulnerability — Cross-Team Key Access on /v1/memory CRUD Endpoints", collect the failing LiteLLM command or request, non-secret configuration, versions, timestamps, request IDs when available, and the smallest reproduction that still triggers the signature.